level (which averaged 2.20 per cent per year). Productivity performance in the 1990s has been worse than that of the 1980s. 6 As of this writing, some twenty-five years have passed since the end of the last long swing expansion, and there is no evidence in the economic data for the major capitalist countries that a new SSA, and with it a new phase of capitalist development, has yet emerged. This paper argues that the construction of a new SSA has been blocked by world developments which are hindering the reconfiguration of the capitalist state as part of a new SSA. These world developments are the increased globalization of capitalism and the demise of state socialism.
The State and Social Structures of Accumulation
The development of each successive SSA in history has involved the reconfiguration of key institutions that affect capital accumulation, including the form of capitalist enterprises, relations among enterprises, the labor process, relations among classes, the role of the state, and the dominant ideology. The reconfiguration of the state has been particularly important in the construction of each SSA. The state has a major effect on the conditions of capital accumulation, not only directly, but indirectly through its effects on all other institutions that affect accumulation --for example, on the form of the capitalist enterprise, on inter-enterprise relations, and on class relations. The direction of reconfiguration of the state in the past has been toward a more interventionist role in relation to the economy in each successive SSA.
In the US, the state played an important but limited role in the mid nineteenth-century SSA, including financing and building transportation improvements, encouraging immigration, and providing cheap land at the frontier. The state played a more interventionist role in the early twentieth-century SSA, including the first steps toward actively regulating business. In the postWorld War II SSA in the US, the state played a very active role, including supervision of capitallabor relations, regulation of the macroeconomy via fiscal and monetary policy, oversight of the The State, Globalization, and Phases of Capitalist Development, by David M. Kotz 4 financial sector, promotion of growth through public investment in economic infrastructure and education, and provision of income security to individuals. The state played a highly interventionist role, with variations in the specifics, in all the major capitalist countries in that period. The heavily state-managed capitalism of that era produced the Golden Age performance noted above.
Since the end of the Golden Age, successive governments in the US and Europe have sought to promote more vigorous capital accumulation but so far without success. The dominant direction of attempted reconfiguration of the state has been the reverse of the previous historical trend, moving back toward the relatively less interventionist state of capitalism=s past.
In the US, state intervention in the economy has been reduced by the administrations of both Republican and Democratic presidents, starting midway through the term of President Jimmy Carter in 1978. There has been deregulation of sectors of business that had been regulated since early in this century, such as transportation, power, and communication. Regulation of the financial sector, which dated to the 1930s, has been substantially loosened. The state has also withdrawn from Keynesian-type macro-regulation. While the central bank does seek to actively forestall inflation, the former government commitment to stabilizing real output and stimulating aggregate demand growth was renounced in the early 1980s and has not been reintroduced.
State regulation of labor-management relations to encourage peaceful collective bargaining was an important part of the previous SSA in the US. This has been replaced by a state policy varying from outright hostility to labor unions and collective bargaining to a neutral stance that leaves large corporations free to continue their heightened resistence to serious collective bargaining. The welfare state has been sharply reduced since the late 1970s, when President Carter first called for cutbacks in social spending. All state income maintenance programs have been pared back, including the overwhelmingly popular social security retirement pension program. The longstanding federal commitment to support those without a means of income was rescinded in 1996.
Investment in public infrastructure, one of the most obviously essential state supports for capital accumulation, declined by nearly one-third as a percentage of GDP from 1966 GDP from to 1997 The judicial and legislative branches of the US government have been leading the effort to pare back economic activism in the 1990s. A remarkable series of US Supreme Court decisions in June 1999 resurrected the long-dead doctrine of states= rights, harking back to the pre-monopoly capital era when business interests had successfully used that doctrine to block the rise of an interventionist federal government. 8 In Since the Thatcher era in the UK, the state has followed a similar course to that of the US.
The UK=s >New Labor= government under Prime Minister Tony Blair has been continuing many of the economic policies of Thatcherism, particularly regarding state intervention in the economy. In continental Western Europe there has been great pressure to move in this direction as well. However, enormous popular resistence has so far limited such >reforms= there.
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Some have suggested that the neoliberal agenda of removing the state from the economy, to let the market rule, has created a new SSA. However, if an SSA is understood to mean, not just any set of institutions that affect capital accumulation, but a set of institutions that effectively promotes 
Indicators of Globalization
Globalization is usually defined as an increase in the volume of cross-border economic interactions and resource flows, producing a qualitative shift in the relations between national economies and between nation-states (Baker et. al., 1998, p. 5; Kozul-Wright and Rowthorn, 1998, p. 1) . Three kinds of economic interactions have increased substantially in past decades:
merchandise trade flows, direct foreign investment, and cross-border portfolio investments. We will briefly examine each. Table 3 shows the ratio of merchandise exports to gross domestic product for selected years from 1820 to 1992, for the world and also for Western Europe, the US, and Japan. Capitalism
The State, Globalization, and Phases of Capitalist Development, by David M. Kotz 8 brought a five-fold rise in world exports relative to output from 1820-70, followed by another increase of nearly three-fourths by 1913. After declining in the interwar period, world exports reached a new peak of 11.2% of world output at the end of the Golden Age in 1973, rising further to 13.5% in 1992. The 1992 figure was over fifty per cent higher than the pre-World War I peak.
[Place Table 3 about here]
Merchandise exports include physical goods only, while GDP includes services, many of which are not tradable, as well as goods. In the twentieth century the proportion of services in GDP has risen significantly. Table 4 shows an estimate of the ratio of world merchandise exports to the good-only portion of world GDP. This ratio nearly tripled during 1950-92, with merchandise exports rising to nearly one-third of total goods output in the latter year. The 1992 figure was 2.6 times as high as that of 1913.
[Place Table 4 about here]
Western Europe, the US, and Japan all experienced significant increases in exports relative to GDP during 1950-92, as Table 3 shows. All of them achieved ratios of exports to GDP far in excess of the 1913 level. While exports were only 8.2% of the total GDP of the US in 1992, exports amounted to 22.0% of the non-service portion of GDP that year (Economic Report of the President, 1999, pp. 338, 444) .
Many analysts view foreign direct investment as the most important form of cross-border economic interchange. It is associated with the movement of technology and organizational methods, not just goods. [Place Table 5 about here] Not all, or even most, international capital flows take the form of direct investment. Portfolio flows (such as cross-border purchases of securities and deposits in foreign bank accounts) are normally larger. One measure that takes account of portfolio as well as direct investment is the total net movement of capital into or out of a country. That measure indicates the extent to which capital from one country finances development in other countries. Table 6 shows the absolute value of current account surpluses or deficits as a percentage of GDP for 12 major capitalist countries. Since net capital inflow or outflow is approximately equal to the current account deficit or surplus (differing only due to errors and omissions), this indicates the size of net cross-border capital flows.
While the ratio nearly doubled from 1970-74 to 1990-96, it remained well below the figure for 1910-14.
[Place Table 6 about here]
While cross-border net movements of capital have not been impressive, the same cannot be said of cross-border gross capital movements. 12 In recent times a very large and rapidly growing volume of capital has moved back and forth across national boundaries. Much of this capital flow is speculative in nature, reflecting growing amounts of short-term capital that are moved around the world in search of the best temporary return. No data on such flows are available for the early part of this century, but the data for recent decades are impressive. During 1980-95 cross-border transactions in bonds and equities as a percentage of GDP rose from 9% to 136% for the US, from 8% to 168% for Germany, and from 8% to 66% for Japan (Baker et. al., 1998, p. 10) . The total volume of foreign exchange transactions in the world rose from about $15 billion per day in 1973 to accounted for 15% of foreign exchange transactions in 1973 but for less than 2% of foreign exchange transactions in 1995 (Bhaduri, 1998, p. 152 ).
While the cross-border flows of goods and capital are usually considered to be the best indicators of possible globalization of capitalism, changes that have occurred over time within capitalist enterprises are also relevant. That is, the much-discussed rise of the transnational corporation (TNC) plays a role here, where a TNC is a corporation which has a substantial proportion of its sales, assets, and employees outside its home country. 13 TNCs existed in the preWorld War I era, primarily in the extractive sector (such as petroleum and mining). In the postWorld War II period many large manufacturing corporations in the US, Western Europe, and Japan became TNCs.
The largest TNCs are very international measured by the location of their activities. One study found that the 100 largest TNCs in the world (ranked by assets) had 40.4% of their assets abroad, 50.0% of output abroad, and 47.9% of employment abroad in 1996 (Sutcliffe and Glyn, 1999, p. 125) . While this shows that the largest TNCs are significantly international in their activities, all but a handful have retained a single national base for top officials and major stockholders. 14 The top 200 TNCs ranked by output were estimated to produce only about 10 per cent of world GDP in 1995 (Sutcliffe and Glyn, 1999, p. 122) .
Some portion of world trade in goods takes place between the subsidiaries of a TNC.
Reliable data on such intra-firm trade are scarce. One sees figures of 30% to 40% cited, as guesses at the percentage of intra-firm trade in world trade, but there is no way to determine their reliability.
An unknown part of intra-firm trade merely represents sales to marketing subsidiaries abroad.
Consequences of Globalization
At the close of the twentieth century, capitalism has become significantly more globalized than ever before. The most important features of globalization today are greatly increased international trade, greatly increased short-term speculative capital flows, and a major role for large TNCs in manufacturing, extractive activities, and finance, operating worldwide yet retaining in nearly all cases a clear base in a single nation-state. The earlier wave of globalization before World War I took place within a world carved up into great colonial empires, which meant that much of the so-called >cross-border= trade and investment of that earlier era actually occurred within a space controlled by a single state.
The rapid rise in merchandise exports began during the Bretton Woods period, as Table 3 showed. So too did the growing role for TNC=s. These two aspects of the current globalization had their roots in the postwar era of state-managed capitalism. This suggests that, to some extent, globalization reflects a long-run tendency in the capital accumulation process rather than just being a result of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and/or the rising influence of neoliberal policies. On the other hand, the extremely rapid increase in cross-border short-term capital flows does appear to reflect the breakdown of the previous system and perhaps the influence of neoliberal policies in the past two decades.
The enormous growth in short-term speculative capital flows has introduced a new element of instability into the international capitalist system. The Asian Financial Crisis which began in the summer of 1997 made this clear, when a sudden and massive reversal from inflow to outflow of short-term capital sank one Asian economy after another. However, the great increase in speculative capital flows could be reversed relatively easily, by means of various reforms that have been proposed since the Asian Financial Crisis (such as transactions taxes). In any event, it is the increase in trade, not the speculative capital flows, that presents a major problem for the construction of a new SSA.
An important consequence of globalization in this period has been to make capitalism significantly more competitive, particularly for large corporations. The Golden Age was characterized by significant monopoly and oligopoly power within the major capitalist economies, as many perceptive analysts have noted (Baran and Sweezy, 1966; Galbraith, 1967 (Sutcliffe and Glyn, 1999, p. 116) .
The high level of world trade reached before World War I occurred within a system based much more on specialization and division of labor. That is, manufactured goods were exported by the advanced capitalist countries in exchange for primary products, unlike today when most trade is in manufactured goods. In 1913 62.5% of world trade was in primary products (Bairoch and KozulWright, 1998, p. 45) . By contrast, in 1970 60.9% of world exports were manufactured goods, rising to 74.7% in 1994 (Baker et. al., 1998, p. 7) .
The valid observation that globalization has weakened labor due to capital=s increased mobility has led some to draw the seemingly reasonable conclusion that globalization has thereby strengthened capital. However, such a conclusion is oversimplified. While offering advantages to capital in its relation to labor, globalization has created problems for capital-capital relations and for the ability of capital to use the state for its own ends. The current form of globalization has been undermining the possibility of reconfiguring the state to usher in a new period of rapid capital accumulation. It does so in two ways, one structural and the other based on class relations.
The structural aspect is the well-known tendency of increased global interdependence to limit the ability of individual states to regulate capital. Any state regulation that might increase costs of production in the home country creates problems in a globalized marketplace, if competitor countries do not have similar regulations. Even regulations undertaken, partly or entirely, to benefit capital in the long-run would encounter this obstacle, since the short-run costs of such regulations might threaten the survival of domestic industries. A version of capitalism based on a big, There is another, more significant effect of globalization on the state. That is a class-relations effect. Specifically, globalization undermines the class coalition which has in the past served as the political basis for the various versions of the regulationist state that have emerged in the twentieth century. In mature capitalism a regulationist state has rested upon support from two main groups, big capital and the working class.
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For example, in the US large corporations emerged and grew powerful in the last three decades of the nineteenth century, producing a division between big and small business. A significant part of the new big business leaders came to support government regulation of various aspects of the economy in the pre-World War I years (Weinstein, 1968) . By 1945 support for an interventionist state by big business became much more solid. By contrast, small business remained adamantly opposed to the big, interventionist state. This division was reflected in the sharp political differences in the decades immediately following World War II between the Business Roundtable, a big business organization which often supported interventionist programs, and the US Chamber of Commerce, the premier small business organization, which hewed to an anti-government stance.
the requirements for assuring growing profits over time. They come to see the state as a potential ally. By contrast, the typical small business faces a daily battle for survival, which prevents attention to long-run considerations and which places a premium on avoiding the short-run costs of taxation and state regulation. This explains why pro-interventionist big business, in alliance with organized labor, provided the main political base for establishing an interventionist state in the US during 1933-48, while small business interests remained in opposition.
Globalization has transformed big business from a supporter to an opponent of the interventionist state. 16 It has done so partly by producing TNCs whose tie to the domestic markets for goods and labor is limited. More importantly, globalization tends to turn big business into small business. The process of globalization has sharply increased the degree of competitive pressure faced by large corporations and banks, as competition has become a world-wide relationship. The second political support for the interventionist state has been the working class, which historically has been able to gain significant material benefits from the regulationist state.
Globalization has been weakening the working class and trade union movement in the mature capitalist countries, as capitalists play off the working class of one country against that of other countries with the ever-present threat of capital flight and/or import competition. One can view the demise of state socialism as an aspect of the globalization of capitalism, in a certain sense. Its disappearance made capitalism a fully global system geographically for the first time ever. 19 Yet the more significant meaning of >globalization= of capitalism refers, not to the percentage of the world that it covers, but the extent to which capitalist systems in the world are economically integrated with one another. Hence, the demise of state socialism deserves to be treated as a distinct factor that has been affecting the role of the capitalist state.
The sudden demise of the rival system of state socialism has contributed to the difficulty of reconfiguring a new regulationist state in capitalism in several ways. First, it weakened the working class in capitalist countries. Since the late nineteenth century the vision of a socialist alternative to capitalism had played an important role in the development of the working class movement in advanced capitalist countries. While the socialist movement split after the Russian Revolution into Communist and Social Democratic wings, both wings were hit hard by the sudden demise of state socialism, which was widely interpreted as demonstrating that socialism is an unworkable system and that there is no alternative to capitalism. As socialism of any sort lost legitimacy, the working class movement as a whole was significantly weakened politically, which reduced its ability to press for a regulationist state.
Second, the demise of state socialism was widely interpreted as proving that any form of state regulation of the economy was doomed to failure. This gave strength to the ideological foes of state regulation and made it more difficult to make the case for a new regulationist state.
Third, fear of the rival system had been an important reason why big capital had previously been so supportive of a regulationist state. Concern that the workers might >turn to Communism= had encouraged acceptance of welfare state measures, and fear of being outperformed economically by the rapidly growing state socialist economies had fostered support for state interventions aimed at accelerating capital accumulation.
Fourth, the existence of the rival bloc had fostered a degree of unity among the major capitalist states unseen in earlier eras of capitalism. The sharp rivalry among major capitalist states, which had dominated capitalist history until 1945, became muted as they sought to maintain a united front, under US leadership, against the Communist enemy. This greatly facilitated the construction and smooth operation of the international institutions of state-regulated capitalism during the Golden Age.
Given its many impacts, one can make a case that the existence of a relatively strong rival social system was a critical factor in the maturation of state-regulated capitalism after World War II.
The capitalist celebration at the sudden and unexpected disappearance of that rival system may have been premature. Its disappearance has contributed significantly to the difficulty in reconfiguring a new state-regulated capitalism, without which there may be no new period of rapid and stable capital accumulation.
Conclusions
The globalization of capitalism in this era, both in the sense of growing economic integration within the capitalist world and of the full geographic spread of world capitalism, has presented an obstacle to the development of a new regulationist state. Without such a regulationist state, it is difficult to see how a new SSA can arise, and with it a new phase of rapid capitalist development.
Without a new SSA, we are likely to see, both internationally and within individual countries, a trend of growing conflict, instability, and uneven development. With economies growing slowly or not at all, the conflicts between capital and labor, and between rival capitalists, will have a zero-sum character and hence are likely to intensify. The absence of an effective regulationist state will leave the economy prone to sharp swings and severe crises. The divergence in the fortunes of different regions, industries, and occupations, which has been widening since the end of the Golden Age, is likely to widen still further. The stresses on the social order will increase over time.
The obvious resolution to this problem in the development of globalized capitalism would be the emergence of a global capitalist state. If the world-scale concentration of capital developed sufficiently through cross-border mergers, one could imagine a world capitalism in which many world markets came to be dominated by a few gigantic firms operating within the regulation of an international capitalist state. The global monopoly capitalists would form the political base for such a global regulationist state.
However, while such an eventuality cannot be ruled out for the distant future, it seems to be an impossibility in the near future. The cultural and political reality of humankind, anchored in a much smaller geographic scale, would seem to rule out the emergence of a world state in the foreseeable future. 20 If monopolization does arise on a world scale in the absence of any genuine global state able to regulate it, the problems of global capitalism would only be accentuated.
A more feasible resolution would be the development of a bloc system in the world. There is also the possibility of a revival of the working class movement in the industrialized capitalist countries, possibly in response to the conditions described above, of intensifying conflict, instability, and uneven development. This might prod big capital back toward support for a regulationist state, and it might also open the possibility of finally superceding capitalism in its heartland. , 1986, 1998, and 1999 . Source : Baker et. al., 1998, p. 11. 4 . Table 2 measures economic growth using business cycle peak years for the US economy as beginning and end points, to show long-run performance. The only exceptions are 1966, which was three years before the next peak but marked a turning point in several important economic series, and 1998, which is the latest year for which data are available as of this writing.
5. The expansion of the 1990s did finally bring the unemployment rate below 5 per cent, as slow growth in labor productivity led to the creation of a large number of low-wage, low-productivity jobs. The low inflation of the late 1990s in the US has been due to a combination of factors, including a labor movement lacking the power to raise wages much even when labor markets tightened and dropping world prices for raw materials due to depressed conditions in much of the world.
6. The increase in output per hour worked is the basis for long-run growth of profits. Capitalists can increase profits for a time by reducing workers= living standards and/or increasing the intensity of labor (as has occurred in the US in the 1990s), but those processes have natural limits.
includes gross investment in non-military structures and equipment by all levels of government.
8. In three related decisions, the court ruled that state governments were immune from lawsuits charging them with violation of federal laws (The New York Times, 24 June 1999, pp. A1, A22).
The Supreme Court has even flirted with overturning the long-standing interpretation of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution that has formed the basis of all federal regulation of business in the twentieth century.
9. The New York Times, 18 May 1999, p. C11. An anonymous IRS tax collector was quoted as saying, >With this new law, if somebody says AI=m not paying,= then we just say Athank you@ and leave.=
10. It appears that the pressure on Japan to pare back its interventionist state has come largely from abroad, and this pressure has been successfully resisted so far.
11. The British economist John Maynard Keynes and US Treasury official Harry Dexter White fought for a system of national capitalisms, while the international bankers and corporations favored an open world economy. For an account of this struggle, see Block, 1977, ch. 3-5. 12. A country that experienced large inflows and outflows of capital of equal magnitude during a year would register zero net capital flow.
13. Some definitions require significant dispersion of activities over some minimum number of different countries.
14. Sutcliffe and Glyn assert that >we are not convinced that there [is] yet any= TNC that is >so international in ownership, production, and management that it no longer has a basic nation state= (Sutcliffe and Glyn, 1999, p. 126 20. In an earlier era capitalism, with new technologies of transportation and communication, brought the world the modern large-scale nation-state and its associated national consciousness.
One could point to current communication and transportation technologies which are tending to produce a world culture and consciousness. However, there is no reason to predict that more
